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Introduction
I am honored to speak to you about the important topic of stewardship. To
be blunt, it is long past due for prestigious academic institutions focused on
corporate governance to address the topic of what obligations institutional
investors owe to their investors and society.
For far too long, we have ignored the separation of ownership from
ownership1 and the reality that institutional investors, and therefore marginal
traders and daily stock prices, have gained enormous power over our public
companies and thus our economies. This has been true in the U.S. for some time,
but is also becoming a trend throughout the OECD.2
Today, I will share my view of what it takes for stewardship to be a
meaningful concept in our 21st Century economy. And, I will also address why
any serious effort to rebalance our corporate governance system and tackle
growing economic insecurity and inequality must include regulating the power of
all classes of institutional investors: pension funds, mutual funds, and hedge funds.

1

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of
Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007); The
Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 673, 687 (2005); Human Freedom and Two Friedmen: Musings on the Implications of Globalization for
the Effective Regulation of Corporate Behaviour, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 262 (2008).
2
See Study on Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance, European Commission (July 2020),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2-d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en
(“Evidence collected over the 1992-2018 period shows that there is a trend for publicly listed companies within the
EU to focus on short-term benefits of shareholders rather than on the long-term interests of the company. Data
indicate an upward trend in shareholder pay-outs, which increased fourfold, from less than 1% of revenues in 1992
to almost 4% in 2018. Moreover, the ratio of CAPEX and R&D investment to revenues has been declining since the
beginning of the 21st century.”).

1

Put simply, this regulation must make institutional investors do what is
required of any faithful fiduciary and any good citizen of a republic — take
seriously their own obligations of fidelity by aligning their conduct with the real
interests of those whose capital they hold and by making money for themselves in
a way that does not cause societal harm.
For many years, stewardship has been more a name for the investment
industry blaming those who manage real companies for every problem, when as a
matter of linguistics, stewardship requires something more inward and
responsibility-accepting. True stewardship involves undertaking meaningful
obligations yourself. In this context, it requires coherent investing, engagement,
and voting policies that emphasize sustainable growth, and recognize that human
investors need — as an economic matter — companies to pay workers fair wages
and treat them with respect, to avoid externalizing costs to other companies,
taxpayers, and consumers, and to be environmentally responsible. This does not
involve talk and inconsistent walk. It requires discipline and focus.
Today, I will explain what moving toward genuine stewardship of this kind
might mean if a new Administration is seated in Washington, and why this
movement is vital to creating an economic system that works for all.
To frame these recommendations, I will first identify the differences
between today’s corporate governance system and the system that existed when

2

most of our key regulatory structures addressing institutional investors were
created. I will then touch on the unsatisfactory outcomes that have resulted during
the last forty years when the power of institutional investors and the stock market
over American public companies grew enormously, and the protections for other
stakeholders, particularly workers, shrunk substantially. After that, I will discuss
why trusting the institutional investor community to reform itself is not an
adequate answer to channeling its conduct to be more consistent with the best
interests of our society and of diversified worker investors. Finally, I finish with
what a sensible framework for updated industry regulation might look like,
emphasizing that this reform, while essential to restoring greater economic equality
and fairness, is not sufficient in itself.
Not Your Grandfather’s:
The Corporate Governance System We Now Have
Any effective initiative to improve institutional investor stewardship must be
grounded on a recognition of the profoundly different corporate governance system
we now have, and how it has outgrown the regulatory structure in which it functions.
As I have noted elsewhere,3 much of the current regulatory structure for our
corporate governance system reflected some implicit assumptions, including that:

3

See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh and Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1871-1872 (2017).

3

 stockholders had a long-term stake in the company’s best interests; most
stockholders were affluent and owned their shares directly, for their own
benefit, and held them for lengthy periods;
 the stockholders who were most active and vocal were those who had the
longest-term stake in the corporation;
 most stockholders invested because they liked the companies and their
management, and did not interfere in their strategic direction;
 certain wealthy investors had so much money that they could, without
harm to society, invest in opaque vehicles on a caveat emptor basis, that
was denied to less affluent investors;
 workers depended largely on pension funds and social security for their
retirements, and did not form a large segment of the investor class;
 most public companies had long-term lenders, who had a deep relationship
with the company and kept a sharp eye on the company’s ability to pay
its debt and weather tough times;
 when corporations became more profitable, they tended to create more
jobs, pay workers better, and give back to their communities of operation;
 corporations had a national, and often regional, focus, and their managers,
directors, employees, lenders, and even stockholders often had ties of
loyalty to those communities; and, finally,
 corporate managers were well but not lavishly paid, a plan of internal
succession was common, and corporate managers tended to live in the
community where the corporation was headquartered and be engaged in
community affairs.

In recent decades, these assumptions have been undermined and often turned
upside down:

4

 corporate stockholder bases turn over rapidly;
 most stock is owned by institutional investors, but represents the capital of
largely silent human investors, and many of these institutional investors
engage in much greater portfolio turnover;
 the actual human investors whose capital is ultimately at stake are largely
bystanders and do not vote;
 the most vocal and active stockholders tend to have investment strategies
most in tension with the efficient market hypothesis, and often involve
hedge funds who only became stockholders after deciding to change the
company and who have no prior or long-term interest in the company’s
well-being;
 Even institutional investors who represent diversified worker-investors,
such as index funds, have pushed manage to the market policies and for
companies to put immediate returns first, even if that involves harm to
other stakeholders;
 The growth of hedge funds and private equity funds has been fueled not
primarily by rich individual investors who bear the risk of losses
themselves, but by other institutional investors like pension funds,
charities, university endowments, and other institutions whose soundness
is important to ordinary Americans and society as a whole;
 The voice of lenders as a stabilizing and risk reducing factor has declined
as corporate debt has been securitized, but without any corresponding
increase in stewardship on the part of mutual funds and others who
represent the investors who hold the risk of insolvency or downgrades;
 the tie between increasing corporate prosperity and the best interests of
corporate workers has been sharply eroded, with corporations not sharing
productivity gains with workers and instead, at the behest of market
pressures, focusing on offshoring and job and wage cuts as methods to
increase profits;

5

 corporations increasingly have no national, much less community, identity
and are willing to not only arbitrage their communities against each other,
but also to abandon their national identity for tax savings; and, finally,
 top corporate managers have been promised pay packages way out of line
with other managers, but in exchange must focus intently on stock price
growth and be willing to treat other corporate constituencies callously if
that is necessary to please the stock market’s short-term wishes (and reap
their personal rewards).
Under this radically different system, human investors are not citizens of the
corporate governance republic, they are the voiceless and choiceless many whose
economic prospects turn on power struggles among the classes of haves —
institutional investors —who directly control the stock of the companies upon which
our nation depends for its continued prosperity. Attention to this institutional
investor sector lagged well beyond its power.
Old tropes — such as stockholders good and management bad — persisted
despite the change in identity of who stockholders were. The focus of academics,
the business media, and, ironically, democrats tended to be on what bad managers
were not doing for either stockholders, society, or stakeholders with little attention
on the increased pressures public companies were facing from institutional
investors. The obsession with agency costs that infatuated key academics like

6

Lucian Bebchuk and Dan Fischel about company managers did not catch their
fancy as to institutional investors.4
The assumption among many academics associated with the law and
economics movement, despite their protestations to the contrary when things went
wrong, was that ECMH meant that whatever increases the current stock price is
optimal, that the market will price any externality risk, and that if there is any
harm, that is government’s responsibility. In focusing on individual companies,
they ignored the fact that most investors are long the economy, not one company,
and that the sum total of externalities at specific companies and downward
pressures on wages was less money for working investors to save, more economic
insecurity, more taxes to pay, and more environmental and public health harm.

4

In fairness to Professor Bebchuk, he has written some articles that could be considered to address the agency costs
of institutional investors. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 Boston U.
L. Rev. 721 (2019); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors,
31 J. Econ. Persp. 89 (2017). But, the bottom line is that he does so mostly to support his argument that mainstream
institutional investors are not pushing public companies to manage to the market strongly enough, and thus that
policy makers should not regulate the activities of activists, even to require more timely disclosure. See, e.g., Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 105 Cornell L. Rev
(Forthcoming 2020) (“The business corporation has proven itself to be a powerful and adaptive mechanism for
producing economic growth and prosperity. As a result, some of those who wish to protect stakeholders might be
attracted to stakeholderism as a way to do so by harnessing corporate power through private action and without
resort to costly regulation. However, the past success of corporations has been based on the presence of effective
incentives for corporate decision-makers. Therefore, with corporate leaders having incentives not to benefit
stakeholders at shareholders’ expense, delegating the guardianship of stakeholder interests to corporate leaders
would prove futile. The promise of pluralistic stakeholderism, we conclude, is illusory.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 40 (2012) (arguing
that the SEC should not adopt new rules that would enhance the disclosure required of stockholders taking a large
and active stake in public companies).

7

That institutional investors voted all their funds in one way did not bother
them, even though funds had very different objectives. That retirement investors
got the same voting policies as quarter to quarter day traders did not matter.
Admittedly, some, including me, harbored some hope that greater
institutional investor/pension power could have some positive benefits. Perhaps:
 mutual and pension funds would put up directors as owner-directors, given
that many of the funds — i.e., index funds — were stuck in long term;5
 funds with long-term horizons would align voting policies to the long term
nature of their investments;
 funds would monitor and check excessive management pay;6
 funds would focus on seating directors who added business value;
 funds would prosecute representative litigation actions that were
legitimate, seek real relief for stockholders, and discourage suits that only
had value for the lawyers involved;7
 funds would push corporate governance policies that optimally balanced
efficiency and accountability, taking into account their own limitations in
terms of stewardship capacity.
 mainstream funds would referee and fairly decide disputes between
activists and management, and ensure that activist plays were only
supported when they made long-term business sense, and were not just
short-term financial engineering.8
5

See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance
System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 953, 993-96 (2003); see
also generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 905 (1991).
6
This was the obvious hope behind mandated Say on Pay.
7
This was the obvious hope of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), Pub. L. 104-67,
109 Stat. 373 (codified at various section of 15 U.S.C.).
8
E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the
Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 897-99 (2013).
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What we got instead was less edifying, and can be fairly summarized as
pushing companies to respond to shifting whims of the stock market and to become
corporate Californias where constant stockholders plebiscites put pressure on
company managers to squeeze other stakeholders, lever up, and engage in constant
rounds of stock buybacks, acquisitions or divestures (whatever is pleasing in the
moment in the market). Certain segments of the pension fund space also seemed
to just enjoy being players, and fomented proposals and meritless litigation.
Thus ensued:
 Paying CEOs with options and other forms of equity tied to total stock
return;
 Ending classified boards;
 Turning withhold votes into pressure tools;
 Insisting on annual Say on Pay votes as a pressure tool, not a reasoned
input on sensible, long-term pay plans focused on sustainable growth;
 Spicing up the board ISS voting policies that made it easy for activists to
gain board seats;
 Voting index funds and socially responsible funds in line with active
funds to save money;
 Pressuring companies to cut worker pay and offshore jobs;
 Pressuring companies to operate without prudent reserves to permit as
much capital as possible be returned to stockholders;

9

 Ignoring that these pressures for immediate returns were encouraging
companies to pollute our politics to secure regulatory advantages and
externalize risks;
 Supporting inversions of American companies to tax havens with less
protective corporate governance;
 Failing to focus on risk management structures or financial prudence at
companies, but instead obsessing over immediate returns and access to
sell-side premiums in M & A.
 Proliferating representative litigation that did not produce any benefits
for stockholders or companies, but just for the plaintiffs’ lawyers
involved, their favored political candidates, and their friends who served
on the staffs of certain public pension funds.

What has resulted from the use of institutional investor muscle in this
manner?
 Growing inequality as a result of a profound shift in gain sharing at the
expense of workers;9

9

An important new paper by Professors Summers and Stansbury illustrates the effect that increased institutional
investor and stockholder power and decreased protection for worker has had on American inequality. Anna
Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent
Evolution of the American Economy (NBER Working Paper 27193), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193. Their
paper confirms the important work done by Lawrence Mishel of the Economic Policy Institute over many years.
See e.g., Lawrence Mishel, The Decline in Unions Has Hurt Nonunion Workers Too, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Sept. 1,
2016).; Lawrence Mishel & Jori Kandra, CEO Compensation Surged 14% in 2019 to $21.3 million, Econ. Pol’y
Inst. (August 18, 2020) (observing that as stockholders have tied CEO pay to stock returns, CEO compensation has
increased while worker wages have stagnated); Lawrence Mishel, Lynn Rhinehart & Lane Windham, Explaining
The Erosion of Private-Sector Unions, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://files.epi.org/pdf/211305.pdf; Josh
Bivens, Lawrence Mishel & John Schmitt, It’s Not Just Monopoly and Monopsony: How Market Power Has
Affected American Wages, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://files.epi.org/pdf/145564.pdf; see also Andy
Green, Christian E. Weller & Malkie Wall, Corporate Governance and Workers, Ctr. Am. Progress (August 14,
2019); Lenore Palladino, Corporate Financialization Hurts Jobs and Wages, Roosevelt Inst. (Sept. 27, 2017); And,
a new report from the European Commission warns that moves toward similar power dynamics in the EU in this
century are starting to manifest themselves in growing inequality and stagnant wages in Europe. Study on
Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance, European Commission (July 2020),
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e47928a2-d20b-11ea-adf7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
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 Resulting economic insecurity and opportunities to exploit this insecurity
through divisive and immoral racial and ethnic appeals.
 Exacerbating, not closing, the racial inequality gap because black people
only gained labor rights recently and are more likely to be working and
lower middle class;
 Corporate influence over regulation and the political process generally
grew, with the result that protections for stakeholders and the
environment were eroded, and important developments like climate
change were not addressed effectively;10
 The need to repeatedly bail out Wall Street and the financial sector,
which has reaped the gains of excessive risk while shifting the costs to
the American public;
 A corporate America that lacked resiliency in face of emergencies
because of inadequate reserves, and supply chains built on the cheap
rather than on the basis of quality and reliability, as illustrated by the
need for companies to lay off workers so soon in the face of the
pandemic despite ten years of recovery and a massive corporate tax cut
and by our failure to produce needed supplies in a timely manner.
 A wave of wasteful litigation that cost companies money that could have
been more productively used to pay workers or invest in future growth.11
To be fair, the institutional investor community now bemoans some of these
realities. In recent years, important voices have emerged acknowledging that

10

John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment: History, Data and Implications, 30 Const.
Comm. 223, 224 (arguing that corporate influence “risks the loss of a republican form of government” or as Coates
terms it, “the risk of Russia”); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding
“We the People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 Harv. CR-CL L. Rev. 423 (2016).
11
Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh and Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange
Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1912-13 (2017) (gathering sources showing that much of the
litigation brought by institutional investors resulted in settlements of no meaningful value to investors); Quinn Curtis
& John Morley, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds,
120 Yale L. J. 84, 117-18 (2010); Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual
Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 Wash. U. L.Q. 1017,
1032 (2005); Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 Harv. Bus. L.
Rev. 1, 13-17 (2016).

11

diversified, human investors need companies that produce sustainable wealth,
respect the environment, and treat stakeholders well,12 and institutional investors
have started to echo them.13 Human investors themselves are becoming more

12

The Business and Society program at the Aspen Institute and B Lab have been in the vanguard of this movement
and, of course, Marty Lipton has long been a full throated voice for stakeholder governance. See American
Prosperity Project: A Nonpartisan Framework for Long-Term Growth, Aspen Inst. (Dec. 2016),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL1.3.17.pdf?_ga=2.171024224.1135763021.1603475164-1326506324.1603475164; Overcoming Short-Termism: A
Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and Business Management, Aspen Inst. (Sept. 9, 2009),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0.pdf?_ga=2.10
9117125.1135763021.1603475164-1326506324.1603475164; Frederick Alexander, et. al., From Shareholder
Primacy to Stakeholder Capitalism: A Policy Agenda for Systems Change, B Lab (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://bcorporation.net/stakeholder-capitalism; Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus.
Law. 101 (1979). For instance, Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act would essentially require that every
American business with over $1 billion in sales become like a Delaware public benefit corporation and have a duty
to “manage or direct the business and affairs of the . . . corporation in a manner that seeks to create a general public
benefit and balances the pecuniary interests of the shareholders of the . . . corporation with the best interests of
persons that are materially affected by the conduct of the . . . corporation.” Accountable Capitalism Act, S.3348
(115th Cong.), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3348; see also 8 Del. C. § 365 (“The board
of directors [of a Delaware public benefit corporation] shall manage or direct the business and affairs of the public
benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its
certificate of incorporation.”). And the BRT issued a revised statement on corporate governance moving in this
direction in 2019. Statement on Corporate Purpose, Bus. Roundtable (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-aCorporation-with-Signatures.pdf. Likewise, other thought leaders have called for corporate governance reform to
require corporations to give more weight to sustainable, ethical growth and more consideration to corporate
stakeholders, like workers, and not just stockholders. See, e.g. Marc Benioff, We Need a New Capitalism (N.Y.
Times, Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/opinion/benioff-salesforce-capitalism.html; Lynn
Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth (Berrett-Koehler 2012); Lenore Palladino, The Economic Argument for
Stakeholder Corporations (Roosevelt Inst., June 2019), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/RI_Economic-Argument-forStakeholder-Corporations_Working-Paper_201906.pdf ;
Judith F. Samuelson, Did the Business Roundtable Sound the Death Knell for Shareholder Primary? (Aspen Inst.,
Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/didthe-business-roundtable-sound-the-death-knell-forshareholder-primacy/; Colin Mayer, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater Good (Oxford 2018); Fredrick
H. Alexander, Benefit Corporation Law and Governance (Berrett-Koehler 2017).
13
Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose: Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs, Blackrock,
https://www.BlackRock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (“To prosper over time, every
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to
society.”); John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds, Wall St. J. (Nov. 29, 2018); State Street Global
Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines, North America (United States and Canada) 8 (Mar. 2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180723160412/https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmentalsocial
governance/2018/03/Proxy-Voting-and-Engagement-GuidelinesNA-20180301.pdf. (“Well-developed environmental
and social management systems . . . generate efficiencies and enhance productivity, both of which impact
shareholder value in the long-term.”); Vanguard, Policies and Guidelines Environmental and Social Matters (2018),
https://web.archive.org/web/20190220221801/https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/policiesandguidelines/ (“[W]e believe our approach strikes the appropriate balance between corporate responsibility and our
fiduciary obligations.”).
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long-term oriented and rational, and gravitating toward index funds.14 Admirably,
some, like State Street, are even stepping up to constrain corporate political
spending that is often at odds with the interests of stakeholders,15 and to vote for
reasonable forum selection provisions to constrain rent-seeking by the plaintiffs’
bar.16 And grudgingly, the reality that most American investors depend on quality
jobs for their ability to invest is being acknowledged, and with the events of this
year shining a light on racial inequality that they cannot blind themselves to,17
these institutions are now voicing a concern not just about gender inclusion, but
finally also admitting the need to address how our nation has treated black
people.18 But there is a problem. Most of this rhetoric remains that, rhetoric, and
even more, most of it is directed at companies, and does not involve self-reflection.

14

See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Working
Paper, Mar 14, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 Boston U. L. Rev. 721,727 (2019) (documenting the growth of index funds
and their rising popularity with investors).
15
Bruce Freed & Dan Carroll, Mutual Fund Support for Corporate Political Disclosure Continues Steady Rise (Ctr.
Political Accountability, Dec. 17, 2019) (“Going against this trend were the Big Three institutional investors –
BlackRock, Vanguard and Fidelity – which continued to oppose the Center’s political disclosure resolution. In
contrast, the other institutional investor behemoth, State Street, increased its support over last year.”).
16
See ISS, Proposed ISS Benchmark Policy Changes for 2021,
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/proposed-benchmark-policy-changes-2021.pdf (proposing to modify
ISS’s guidelines to generally recommend approval of forum selection clauses in corporate bylaws).
17
For an excellent overview of how the coronavirus pandemic has further exposed our economy’s severe racial
inequality, see Elise Gould & Valerie Wilson, Black Works Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions—
Racism and Economic Inequality, Econ. Pol’y Inst. (June 1, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workerscovid.
18
See, e.g., Blackrock, Our Actions to Advance Racial Equity and Inclusion (June 22, 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/social-impact/advancing-racial-equity (“While we are still refining
our efforts and goals, our focus is on . . . [p]romoting workforce and leadership diversity by engaging with and
seeking reporting by the companies in which we invest . . . . We also will continue to emphasize the importance of
diversity in the board room, considering personal characteristics like gender, as well as race and ethnicity, in
addition to professional experience.”); Saijel Kishen, State Street to Press Companies on Boasting Racial Diversity,
Bloomberg (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-27/state-street-to-press-companieson-boosting-racial-diversity.
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Most of all, it does not yet involve acknowledging that money managers’
success in making American public companies playthings of the stock market was
a substantial cause of these suboptimal outcomes for our nation and its citizens.
Reasons Why The Government Must Play A Role
We are thus at a moment too common in our history. Substantial inequities
have led to calls for action to provide greater fairness and opportunity for the
many, in part by checking excesses of the privileged few. At these times, the
privileged often say — our bad, sorry, we’ve got it now — leave it to us. For
corporate scholars, the Merrick Dodd response.
But when a powerful interest has had generations to “get it,” the public
should be rightly skeptical. Had the interest gotten it, things would not be the way
they are. And for realists, poor outcomes are not usually evidence that the
privileged are bad people, but that the rules of the game are not well tailored, thus
promoting movement toward the worst angels of our nature. Realists demand
effective external constraints promoting socially responsible conduct. For
corporate scholars, the Adolph Berle approach.
As you know, I am firmly of the good Adolph school and believe that we are
in the current predicament because of our failure to remember the lessons of
history and to address new phenomenon to ensure that they are not exploited to

14

unbalance the New Deal/social democratic consensus that saved us from fascism
and communism, and provided a sound framework for a fair market economy.19
As applied to the institutional investor segment, there is even more reason to
believe that government action to address new market dynamics and their effects
on society are long overdue.
For starters, it is striking how much pressure there has been for government
action to regulate public companies that make real products and deliver real
services,20 when the market checks on public companies are so much more
substantial than those faced by institutional investors. Friends of mine like Lucian
Bebchuk have long bemoaned that there are not enough proxy contests, hostile
takeover attempts, and derivative suits against public company boards. For that
reason, they have argued that government should change the rules of the game to
facilitate direct democracy at public companies, incent CEOs to manage to the
market, require certain board committees, and other important measures — such as
disclosure policies — to channel corporate behavior in the direction they favor.21
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Made for this Moment: The Enduring Relevance of Adolf Berle’s Belief in a Global New Deal,
42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 267 (2019).
20
Consider, for example, the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002), and
Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010), almost all of which addressed operating companies,
without addressing in any meaningful way the institutional investors whose pressures inflated the balloon of bubble
capitalism.
21
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction To The Dueling Ideological
Mythologists Of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate
Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
1759 (2006) (both discussing Professor Bebchuk’s support for direct democracy at American corporations, and his
view that stockholders have too little influence); see also generally, Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating
Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005).
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They do so because they argue that the old Wall Street rule — exit to another
company in the Russell 3000 — or the potent tools stockholders have under state
law, are not enough. No, much more must always be done to check the excessive
“agency costs” of public company managers and directors.
But, for some reason, these manage to the market advocates never apply the
same thinking to institutional investors. For workers lucky enough to have a
pension, they have no rights to replace their trustees or exit, they must depend on
the prudence of their trustees, and suits against such trustees are far less common
than suits against public companies. For 401(k) worker-investors, the Wall Street
rule is far less helpful, because they are stuck with moving from one fund to
another in the fund families chosen by their employer and their money is stuck in
until age 60. Mutual fund proxy fights and derivative suits are rarer than sashimi.
Furthermore, the existing governmental regime is much more outdated than the
Delaware General Corporation Law or even the federal securities laws, and involve
at best an adequate 1970’s-relevant governance regime confronting an industry
that has grown in complexity and sophistication far more rapidly than almost any
segment of the economy, except perhaps tech, since that time.
Key developments — such as intermediaries like charities, university
endowments, and pension funds putting the public at risk by investing in opaque
hedge funds without track record information or knowing what special deals are

16

being cut with more favored investors — the rise of synthetics and derivatives and
their important effects — the changes in how corporations use debt capital and
their implications for the relative voice of equity and debt capital — the interaction
of demands for mutual funds to act as stewards and the cost constraints they are
under to compete with each other — the payment of money managers on horizons
that do not match that of their underlying investors — have not been factored
adequately into regulatory action. On many fronts, no action has been taken at all.
On others, it has been done with a blinkered view of the full implications.
The overall effect of this inaction is clear: virtually all institutional investor
sectors have pushed management to the market policies. The sectors combine to
pressure public companies to favor immediate returns to stockholders as the first
priority of corporate governance, to push corporations to minimize reserves,
restrict worker pay, offshore and cut jobs, take on more risk, and to be open at all
times to sale. In response, corporations have done all these things, and have also
acted on the political process to make it easier for them to please stockholders, by
externalizing risk to society and other stakeholders. Corporations have used
treasury funds and other resources to seat candidates and to lobby for policies that
undercut unions, wages, climate change response, consumer protection, and help
industries externalize their costs to society.

17

The bottom line is when one arrow goes way up — stockholder power —
and one other goes way down — stakeholder voice and power, in particular that of
workers — the more powerful interest wins. This has been vividly illustrated in
the returns to stockholders and those paid to serve them — top executives whose
pay is tied to total stock return — in comparison to American workers. This is not
about the pie not growing. There has been plenty o’ new pie. It is about the have’s
taking a much bigger share of the pie.
Similar power imbalances have resulted in the failure to address climate
change, opioids, financial risk-taking by the banking sector, the anticompetitive
effects of big tech, and shifts in risk from the wealthy investor class and the
companies that caused these externalities to the public, in the form of recessions,
unemployment, huge bailouts, and public health and consumer harm.. The overall
cost of these externalities is a drag on overall economic efficiency, a cost borne by
real working investors who own the whole economy.
That this phenomenon involves hurting the economic interests of pension
and 401k investors — who depend on quality jobs for their wealth and ability to
save for retirement, are dependent on the whole economy, and who pay for
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externalities as taxpayers, air breathers and water drinkers, and consumers — has
for far too long been ignored by institutional investors.22
Their recent recognition of what their human investors actually need is
welcome, but remains blinkered. Rather than accept responsibility for themselves,
they continue to mostly externalize responsibility by urging public companies to do
better to protect stakeholders and the environment.
But, that is not stewardship in its fullest sense. That is shirking.
What stewardship involves is accepting your own fiduciary responsibility to
align your behavior with the legitimate interests of those you are charged with
protecting.
It’s good to call on companies to address climate change. But can they do so
unless you show, not by words, but deeds that you support them in doing so?
It’s useful to call on companies to address racial inequality and growing
economic insecurity. But can they do so unless you recognize that the best way for
companies to help close these gaps is to pay their workers more, because this will
disproportionately benefit black people and all suffering economic insecurity? If
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In a prior paper, I gathered the economic evidence that shows how much Americans depend on their access to a
good job and wages for their wealth. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh and Blood
Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. at 1876-1882
(2017). In that same piece, I also cited evidence that black Americans were far less likely to have retirement savings
and when they had them, they were at much lower levels than white Americans. Id. at 1882.
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you do not support companies in giving fair wage increases and putting worker
well-being first in recessions, how can companies do so?
It’s helpful to call for more equality and diversity at companies, but do you
mean it? Was the failure to consider racial diversity until the murder of George
Floyd a signal that the prior focus on just gender diversity was a marketing
strategy? And are you going to follow up and actually focus on racial equality in
reality or just in words?
It’s understandable that you react when there is an environmental
catastrophe, such as an oil spill, a consumer injury, such as opioids or a data
breach, that hits the stock price hard and causes public outrage, but do you use
your voting power to focus on whether companies have effective risk management
structures at both the management and board level? Or do you just pressure them
to manage to the market and then opportunistically complain when something goes
wrong, so that you are not exposed to criticism for supporting industry policies that
put stockholders’ demand for immediate returns over fairness to society?
Do you call for woke company policies but abdicate in considering whether
companies are using investors’ money to elect candidates and lobby for policies
that undercut causes like racial fairness, worker fair pay and safety, and
environmental responsibility?
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Put bluntly, there is a large gap between what even high-minded institutions
are asking of companies and what they are asking of themselves. Ultimately
public companies cannot treat their workers, consumers, taxpayers, communities,
and the environment more fairly than their investors will support.23 If investors
talk woke in public, but obsess over TSR and buybacks in private meetings and in
voting their shares, TSR and buybacks will win out.
For these and other reasons I don’t have time to discuss, effective
stewardship must involve government regulation that requires all institutional
investors with power in our society to use it responsibly. This is also essential to
help those trying to do it right become the industry standard, because it will
prevent them from continuing to be undercut by competitors who use their own
failure to be good stewards as a chance to compete on cut rate pricing and shortterm returns.
Institutional Investor Reforms An Essential but not Sufficient Condition of a
21st Century New Deal
Before I set forth what reforms might foster greater stewardship and positive
social impact by institutional investors, I underscore the obvious. Institutional
investor reform alone cannot restore fairness to our economy. Reforms to increase
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Rebecca Henderson, What Would It Take To Get Businesses To Focus Less on Shareholder Value? Harv. Bus.
Rev. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/08/what-would-it-take-to-get-businesses-to-focus-less-on-shareholdervalue (noting that it is not corporate law, but the power dynamics and stock market pressure under which public
companies operate that make it difficult for them not to focus on immediate returns to stockholders as the priority,
rather than more responsible, sustainable approaches to long-term growth).
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the wages and voice of labor, protect consumers, tackle climate change, and invest
in basic research and infrastructure are indispensable, as are moves to make the
rights of workers and the protection of the environment central to the international
trading regime.24 And of course, companies themselves, and large private
companies, must be required to give greater consideration to sustainable growth,
fair treatment of workers and other stakeholders, and environmental responsibility.
But although stewardship-promoting regulation of institutional investors alone is
not adequate, it is essential.
Unless the powerful interests that control the voting of public companies are
required to align their conduct with the needs of the human beings they serve,
public companies and our economy will not be able to do so. Pretending otherwise
is naïve and injurious to economic security and fairness.
For that reason, any 21st Century New Deal must include bold action to
update the regulatory structure within which institutional investors operate. That
involves requiring all the key sectors — mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge
funds — to accept their responsibility as faithful fiduciaries, or in the parlance of
this conference, as good stewards. And it involves a variety of techniques, such as
requirements for institutional investors to align their use of power with the interests
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For my own ideas along these lines, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism, Roosevelt
Institute (August 2020), https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/.
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of their human clients and society, and to make fairer disclosure about their
behavior and interests.
Key steps to encourage more alignment toward sustainable returns, fair
treatment of workers, and environmental responsibility should include:


Requiring institutional investors to consider—as part of the fiduciary
duties they owe to their clients—their ultimate beneficiaries’ investment
objectives and horizons, such as saving for retirement or education, and
require institutional investors to consider their ultimate beneficiaries’
economic and human interest in having companies create quality jobs and
act responsibly toward their consumers and the environment as part of their
decision making process.



Specifically, institutional investors who take human investors’ money,
including mutual funds and pension funds, should be required to consider
the investment objectives and horizons of their ultimate beneficiaries, such
as saving for retirement, saving for their children’s education, or investing
in a socially responsible manner, when making voting and other
stewardship decisions. Specific obligations would be imposed on index
and pension funds to consider their investors’ interests in sustainable, longterm growth and the diversified nature of their portfolios.25 In particular,
that would require index funds and other funds that hold a broad swath of
the economy, to recognize their fiduciary duty to support governance
policies that foster overall economic growth and minimize externalities,
thus fostering the most sustainable portfolio and overall wealth creation
for their investors.26



Prohibiting institutional investors from relying on proxy advisory firms
unless the proxy advisor’s recommendations are tailored to the fund’s

This would, for example, have the effect of promoting voting on key issues — such as a public company’s desire
to become a public benefit corporation — that aligns the interests of investors in sustainable wealth creation with
company-level corporate governance that does the same thing. And by these means, the relative influence of those
institutional investors, such as index funds, pension funds, and socially responsible funds, will grow, providing for
more balance and a greater focus on responsible, durable wealth creation than is currently the case.
26
Cf. Rebecca Henderson, Shareholder Value in a Burning World, Project Syndicate (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/shareholder-value-corporations-and-climate-change-by-rebeccahenderson-2020-10?barrier=accesspaylog (“At the level of the entire economic system, there is no fundamental
incompatibility between maximizing profits and addressing climate change. But there is a massive collective action
problem…..”).
25
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investment style and horizon. This would create incentives for proxy
advisory firms to do better, and encourage them to develop voting
recommendations and policies tailored to index investors, who depend on
economy-wide, sustainable wealth creation.


Requiring all institutional investors to consider their ultimate
beneficiaries’ overall economic and human welfare, in determining how to
prudently invest their funds for sustainable, ethical portfolio growth. This
plain authorization for all investment funds to consider EESG factors will
eliminate any fear, heightened by the Trump Administration DOL’s recent
actions, that any institutional investor cannot take into account the moral
and ethical factors that human investors can consider.



Requiring institutional investors to disclose how their voting policies and
other stewardship practices ensure the faithful discharge of their new
fiduciary duties and take into account information reported by large
companies on employee, environmental, social, and governance matters.
If we want operating companies to act in a sustainable and ethical fashion,
then institutional investors must make consideration of key EESG issues a
central factor in their approach to stewardship and their investors and the
public deserve information to determine if they are doing so. This
requirement should parallel new EESG disclosure obligations that should
be imposed on all large companies, private or public, but be shorter in
length and focused on how institutions factor these issues into their
stewardship decisions.



Requiring institutional investors to align their voting on corporate
governance policies, such as the frequency of say on pay votes, with their
EESG policies and their own stewardship capacity: Currently, institutional
investors support more votes on everything, even when they realize that
they cannot focus on all of them. This is evidenced by annual SOP votes,
where proxy advisors are the key determinants of outcomes, because there
are too many votes for thoughtful consideration. Real stewardship
demands ensuring that investors and society are not hurt by making
companies spend scarce resources on votes that institutional investors
cannot responsibly consider and by using votes on specific issues as a
sideways tool to express discontent in a bad year, rather than to give
reasoned input on the company’s strategic approach.
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Requiring a certain level of stewardship by all institutional investors: My
friends Professors Bebchuk and Lund are not wrong that the leading index
funds do not have enough stewardship resources to adequately consider all
the votes that occur. That is why fewer, more meaningful, votes should
occur. But another problem must be addressed: the big index funds do
way better than most. If we are going to encourage institutions to vote,
then all of them must be expected to invest in stewardship, so that perverse
pricing pressures do not inhibit stewardship. Absent a return to the Wall
Street rule, an industry-wide expectation of stewardship is essential, so that
those trying to do things right are not undercut by free-riders and the
benefits of greater alignment are lost.



Requiring investment funds invested in corporate debt securities to
develop and act on stewardship policies to protect investors, reduce
excessive corporate risk, and provide needed balance to our corporate
governance system: In the last two generations, institutional investors
managing equity funds have been pressured to use their voice, and this has
manifested itself in a tilt toward stockholders at the expense of other
stakeholders. Evidence exists that activism largely results in transfers of
wealth from stakeholders like workers and debt holders to equity holders.27
But most human investors do not just invest in equities, they also invest in
debt, and especially in the years when they need their portfolio to pay for
college for their kids or retirement for themselves. As we have encouraged
equity investors to use their voice, we have not required funds holding debt
securities to do the same, and to put in place stewardship policies that
encourage systemic practices that discourage excessive leverage and risk
in American corporations, and thus protect their investors and in the course
of doing so also help American workers and communities who suffer harm
from avoidable corporate insolvencies caused by risky balance sheet
practices.



Requiring all corporate political spending be under plans approved by a
super-majority of stockholders and that institutional investors align their
voting on political spending with their EESG policies, and ensure that
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A few years ago, I pulled the then-extant evidence on this topic together. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When
the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh and Blood Perspective On Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance
System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017) (citing scholarly studies coming to the conclusion that gains from activism to
stockholders often involved shifts in wealth to stockholders from workers and creditors), and was also associated
with a decline in research and development). For a reader interested in a balanced and accessible discussion of the
literature, the following article by Professors Coffee and Palia remains essential. John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia,
The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545 (2016).
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companies do not invest in dark money political action committees, multicandidate committees, or in the campaigns of candidates whose policy
views are not consistent with the company’s stated EESG commitments or
the investors’ own policies. One of the major reasons for the imbalance in
power that now exists is that companies have been able to use their
resources to act on the political process to externalize costs (such as of
environmental compliance or worker safety) to society and stakeholders
like workers, and to undermine regulatory protections for workers,
consumers, and the environment. Institutional investors, with the
exception of certain institutions, have abdicated on this important subject
and must be forced to step up. Investors do not invest with institutional
investors so that their capital can be deployed by public companies for
political purposes.28


Requiring pension funds and other investment funds to have all litigation
authorized by the board, not staff, before filing, and to make a
determination that the benefits of the litigation, in terms of recovering
financial losses caused by a potential breach of fiduciary duty or corporate
governance principles, is worth the cost to the fund and the company’s
stakeholders. Likewise, any settlement should be authorized by the board
on the same criteria, and in supporting any fee, the board should have to
determine that the benefit to the fund’s investors and the other stockholders
justifies the fee.
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For a further discussion of my own perspective on these phenomenon, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Fiduciary Blind Spot:
The Failure of Institutional Investors to Prevent the Illegitimate Use of Working Americans’ Savings for Corporate
Political Spending, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1007 (2020); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Court’s Role
in Eroding “We The People’s” Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423
(2016). For a recent empirical report demonstrating the use by public companies to support candidates and committees
whose values were inconsistent with stated company EESG policies, see Conflicted Consequences, Ctr. Political
Accountability (July 21, 2020), https://politicalaccountability.net/hifi/files/Conflicted-Consequences.pdf. Respected
scholars have warned that the effect of individual companies and industries in wielding their wealth to bend regulatory
policies to their wills is more likely to hamper overall economic growth and to reduce social welfare. John C. Coates
IV, Corporate Speech & The First Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 Const. Comment. 223 (2015);
Rebecca Henderson and Karthik Ramanna, Do Managers Have A Role to Play in Sustaining The Institutions of
Capitalism?, at 4, 7-14, Brookings Institution, (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/do-managershave-a-role-to-play-in-sustaining-the-institutions-of-capitalism/ (warning of the “real risk that private sector
engagement with the political process will fundamentally distort the institutions of capitalism and managers have a
responsibility to the system itself” and that this risk is heightened because businesses exert influence on subjects
involving “thin political processes” where countervailing interests are less likely to be effectively represented and
heard).
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These requirements should be accompanied by voluntary action by mutual
and pension funds to bring their own stewardship practices into closer alignment
with the real interests of their worker-investors. By way of example, leading mutual
funds are now voicing support for sustainable growth and stakeholder governance.
They need to match this rhetoric by a stated willingness to support public companies
that wish to become a public benefit corporation under Delaware law, and commit
themselves to a mandatory shall duty of respect to stakeholders and to sustainable
wealth creation for their stockholders.29 Furthermore, they need to do more to ensure
they have adequate information when activists pressure companies to take actions
with long-term consequences for stuck-in stockholders and company workers. For
starters, that would include refusing to support any activist that does not: 1) fully
disclose its entire ownership position, long, short or otherwise hedged, in a clear
way, revealing its true net long position; 2) disclose the terms of its fund
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Delaware has now made it possible for an existing public company to convert by a majority vote. See Del. House
Bill 341,
https://legis.delaware.gov/json/BillDetail/GenerateHtmlDocument?legislationId=48122&legislationTypeId=1&docT
ypeId=2&legislationName=HB341 (removing the requirement in § 363(b) that a two-thirds majority of stockholders
is required for a Delaware corporation to convert to a public benefit corporation). Notably, this year, Lemonade
and Vital Farms went public as benefit corporations with favorable pricing. Form S-1, Lemonade, Inc. (June 8,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1691421/000104746920003416/a2241721zs-1.htm; Form S-1,
Vital Farms, Inc. (July 9, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1579733/000119312520190455/d841617ds1.htm. And Danone became
the French equivalent of a benefit corporation without adverse effect to its stock price or the price at which its ADRs
sell in the U.S. Maitane Sardon & Cristina Roca, Danone to Place Greater Focus on ESG Wall St. J. (May 20,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/danone-to-place-greater-focus-on-esg-11590004975. As scholars have noted,
there is reason to believe that companies, like benefit corporations, that embrace a purpose of making profits in a
socially responsible way that is respectful of all stakeholders cannot only succeed as profitable businesses, they are
likely essential to tackling challenging problems like climate change. E.g., Rebecca Henderson & George Serafim,
Tackling Climate Change Requires Organizational Purpose, AEM Papers and Proceedings, 110: 177-180 (May
2020); see generally, Colin Mayer, Prosperity: Better Business Makes the Greater Good (2019).
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arrangements that bear on how long the activist can and is likely to hold its shares in
the target company; 3) promise to have one of its representatives serve on the
company’s key risk management committee; and 4) making a binding promise not
to exit its investment in the company on preferential terms and to accept any market
discount that is required of other investors in unwinding their position.30 By means
like this, mainstream investors would understand how truly committed activists are
to living with the long-term consequences of their own strategy for the company, or
whether they are just telling other stuck-in investors that they will be better off if
they listen to the helpful hints of a momentary visitor in their ranks.31
To fully address the lack of accountability and information about hedge funds
and other private investment funds, however, regulatory action of the following kind
must be taken:


Close loopholes so that activist hedge funds must make a full and timely
disclosure of their economic interests in the companies they seek to
influence, and bring America’s regulation into line with the other major
market economies.



To this end, the SEC should revise its rules governing Schedule 13D
disclosure so that: (i) the definition of beneficial ownership includes
ownership of any derivative instrument that provides the opportunity to
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The empirical evidence is that activist hedge funds typically hold their shares for one to two years at most, and
many for less than a year. Alon Brav et. al, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. Fin. 1729, 1749 (2008); Coffee & Palia, 41 J. Corp. L. at 572; Strine, Who Bleeds, 126 Yale L.J. at 1892.
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Others have noted that the compensation structures for fund managers are often short term in nature, and do not
align with their investors’ horizons. Strine, Who Bleeds, 126 Yale. J. at 1915- 1917 (compiling studies and
commentary to this effect). Much attention has been paid to CEO pay at public companies and the efforts to
“reform” it to date have been, in my judgement, dismaying in their effect. For that reason, I am reluctant to tinker in
this area for mutual fund managers, but do note that the lack of alignment puts pressure on managers to focus on
results over a time frame that does not match their investors’, especially those saving for retirement.
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profit from an increase in the value of the subject security and any contract
or device that allows the person to control the voting power of the equity
security; (ii) disclosures of any short interest or ownership of a derivative
instrument that allows the investor to profit from a decrease in the
security’s value are required; (iii) 13D filers could not acquire additional
shares (or derivatives) once the investor crosses the 5% threshold (for
large-cap companies) or a 10% threshold (for smaller companies) until a
13D has been filed and available to the public for 24 hours; (iv) disclosure
is required of contractual or other arrangements that affect the filer’s
commitment or ability to hold the subject security, including the ability of
the filer’s investors, if any, to redeem or withdrawal their capital; and v) a
standard form is developed that activists must use to disclose, in clear
understandable terms, their net long position and keep it updated as that
changes by more than one percent in any direction.


Strengthen the securities laws to make it illegal for activists to tip others
during the period before they file under Section 13(d): There is abundant
evidence of abnormal trading by pack members before the alpha wolf files
makes public disclosure of its stake. This allows for the possibility of
creeping takeovers at the expense of other stockholders and stakeholders,
and is unfair to other traders in the market place. Given the power activists
have to move stock prices just by their presence, they should be prohibited
from leaking to other investors during this period and if they do so and
trading results, they should face liability.32



Address the investor and societal risks caused by private funds that are
subject to only limited disclosure requirements. Although hedge funds and
private equity funds should not be required to disclose proprietary
information about their trading strategies that would inhibit their ability to
conduct their unique approach to investing, it is long past time when they
should be permitted to cloak their track records, their terms of investment,
special deals to their favorites, and other important information because
their investors should be presumed able to operate on a caveat emptor
basis. The accredited investor and qualified purchaser exceptions were
not intended to allow pension funds, universities, or charitable institutions
to put money in risky investments not backed up by appropriate disclosures
and standards of integrity. But many have been harmed by investing in
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See Coffee & Palia, at 562-566; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides? 124 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (2010).
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private equity and hedge funds without adequate information. These losses
hurt workers and society and can require taxpayers to fill the resulting
holes. Pension funds and charities lack enough reliable information to
prudently assess whether these investment are appropriate for their
portfolio on both a risk-return basis and on a cost basis. The SEC and
Congress should work together to fix this important problem.
Finally, to promote more thoughtful, rational investing by both human
customers of the institutional investor community, and the institutional investors
themselves, the tax policies affecting the industry should be reformed. In
particular, a financial transactions tax should be adopted that would not only
discourage destabilizing and risky speculative trading without economic
substance, but discourage fund-hopping by mutual fund investors. Likewise, the
long-standing abuse of the carried interest loophole should be shut, and capital
gains for holdings of less than five years should be taxed like income earned by
sweat.
By these means, the incentives for productive investing that is positive for
society will be increased, and the revenues raised in this Pigouvian manner can
help fund clean infrastructure to address climate change and create quality jobs,
basic research to fuel long-term growth and American competitiveness, and
investments in the ongoing training and education of American workers.
***
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None of these reforms will harm the institutional investment industry in the
long term. Rather, they will legitimize an industry whose power has long
outgrown its expected responsibilities. And done in concert with a 21st Century
New Deal to focus our economy on sustainable growth, environmental
responsibility, and, most of all, the fair treatment of the workers who make
capitalism a success, these measures will create a more equitable and prosperous
America, and by doing so, expand the class of Americans who have the means to
invest with the industry for college for their kids, retirement for themselves, and
enjoy genuine economic security. All that this involves is making sure that a
powerful segment of our economy’s responsibilities be aligned with its power.
Put another way, all that is required is that the have’s do a little for the common
good. That is not much to ask.
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